A damning report into the Iraq war, the intelligence failures leading to it, and its aftermath was published today. Here's what you need to know.
Daniel Leal-olivas / AFP / Getty Images
The official UK inquiry into the Iraq war and its aftermath, led by Sir John Chilcot, has been published today seven years after it was launched. Below are some of the key findings of the report, as set out by Chilcot in his speech launching the 2.6-million-word report.
This post will be updated through the day with material from the report.
"We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort."
"The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction – WMD – were presented with a certainty that was not justified"
"The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate"
"The Government failed to achieve stated objectives"
In March 2003: "There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein. The strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time."
Tony Blair and George Bush
The decision by the UK cabinet to go to war with Iraq was made on 17 March 2003, but was "shaped by key choices" made by Blair over 18 months.
UK policy had been to manage Iraq by containing Saddam Hussein. By April 2002, when Blair met Bush in Crawford, Texas, there had been a "profound change in the UK's thinking".
"• The Joint Intelligence Committee has concluded that Saddam Hussein could not be removed without an invasion.
"• The Government was stating that Iraq was a threat that had to be dealt with. It had to disarm or be disarmed.
"• That implied the use of force if Iraq did not comply – and internal contingency planning for a large contribution to a military invasion had begun."
"On 28 July, Mr Blair wrote to President Bush with an assurance he would be with him 'whatever'", but for a coalition said Bush would need progress on the Middle East Peace Process, UN authority, and a shift in global public opinion.
"Mr Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq.
"The UK's relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgments differ."
Tim Sloan / AFP / Getty Images
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